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ABSTRACT
A wealth of scholarship examines the reasons Supreme Court
Justices retire. While political scientists and legal scholars have analyzed
the political and personal factors that play a role in retirements with
varying conclusions, little has been written about the judicial careers of
senior justices. This study compares the careers of the eleven senior
justices who have sat by designation on the federal circuit courts. The
senior justices are compared with each other as well as with active justices,
with active circuit judges, and with senior circuit judges. The goal of this
essay is to increase our understanding of senior service.
This essay hypothesizes that senior justices will be deferred to more
often while sitting on a circuit panel and that they will have some extra
insight into the Supreme Court’s reasoning or cares as a result of their
active service. The data, however, does not support these hypotheses.
Rather more modest and partial answers seem to explain the results.
Analyzing a variety of factors, including the instances where each
justice sat in a majority, wrote the opinion, or was overturned by the
Supreme Court, this study finds that senior justices are not unique in their
application of the law. Although their prior service on the Supreme Court
likely provides these senior justices with additional insight into the Court’s
dynamics, they seem unable to translate that insight in order to persuade
their former colleagues or arrive at the correct decision in the first instance
any more often than other circuit judges.
Senior justices are equally as likely as circuit judges to be overturned
by the Supreme Court. They produce far fewer opinions, concurrences,
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and dissents than active Supreme Court Justices, active circuit judges, and
even senior circuit judges, although this latter group has the most parallels
with senior justices. The only category in which senior justices surpass
their former Supreme Court colleagues and senior circuit judges is the
likelihood that they will author an opinion. This essay posits that the
results it finds are products of the senior justices’ seniority and reduced
workload on appellate panels, among other variables. Further research and
examination are needed to determine if alternative factors account for this
essay’s other findings.
INTRODUCTION
In 1937 justices became eligible to retire from the Supreme Court
and sit by designation on lower courts. Eleven out of the thirty-eight
eligible justices have done so.1 This essay examines and compares their
service as senior justices on the United States Courts of Appeals in order
to shed light upon the significant judicial work senior justices undertake.
Most scholarship on the retirement of Supreme Court justices
examines the timing, politics, and impact of life tenure upon the justices’
decisions to leave the bench.2 Only one study, an article by Minor Myers
III, briefly examines the careers of retired Supreme Court justices up and
until Justice White.3 This study updates Myers’ work and expands upon
it, analyzing and comparing the senior tenures of justices after they leave
the Supreme Court to increase our understanding of senior service.
Many differences emerge between the service of active and senior
Supreme Court Justices. Similar differences exist between active and
senior circuit judges, on one hand, and senior justices, on the other. This
essay catalogs these differences, as well as the similarities, and draws
conclusions from the data, investigating the unique properties of the senior
service of Supreme Court justices. This study offers an opening salvo in
a field where almost no research exists, presenting data and analyses to
quantify the senior careers of Supreme Court justices.
This essay proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a statutory and
judicial history of senior service. Part II offers the hypotheses that drove
this study. Part III covers the essay’s methodology and presents the data
1 See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (May 9, 2015, 7:44PM). This
tally does not include today’s active members of the Court.
2 See, e.g., DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT
THE END (1999) (studying why and when justices leave the Court); ARTEMUS WARD,
DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (2003) (examining the political factors influencing retirement from the Court).
3 Minor Myers III, The Judicial Service of Retired United States Supreme Court
Justices, 32 J. SUP. CT. HISTORY 46 (2007).
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analyses and observations. Part IV explains the findings, while the
conclusion presents considered thoughts and queries for the future.
I. HISTORY OF RETIRED JUSTICES
The year 1937 redefined retirement for Supreme Court justices.
Before that year, justices could resign their commission from the bench
but not take senior status.4 The passage of the Retirement Act of 1937
changed this legal landscape, permitting justices to assume senior status
for the first time.5 While senior justices no longer hear cases on the
Supreme Court,6 they are eligible to, and frequently do, sit on Courts of
Appeals by designation. This section provides a history of the provisions
enabling justices to leave the Court, assume senior status, and sit by
designation on lower courts. It also offers a description of the judicial
service of these senior justices on the Courts of Appeals.
A. Retiring from the Supreme Court
Following the failure of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Courtpacking plan, Congress passed the Retirement Act of 1937.7 Before the
passage of this Act, justices had far fewer options when leaving the Court.
After the Act’s passage, justices could take senior status and continue to
hear and decide cases on lower federal courts. Since this reform, thirtyeight justices have left the Court with eleven assuming senior status and
hearing cases on lower federal courts.8 This practice is commonly,
although incorrectly, referred to as retiring from the Supreme Court.

4 Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming off the Bench: Legal and Policy
Implications of Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme
Court, 61 DUKE L. J. 81, 85 note 13 (2011).
5 Matthew Madden, Anticipated Judicial Vacancies and the Power to Nominate, 93
VA. L. REV. 1135, 1156–57 (2007).
6 For articles on the justices’ decisions to retire, see, e.g., Kelly J. Baker, Senior
Judges: Valuable Resources, Partisan Strategists, or Self-Interest Maximizers?, 16 J.L. &
POL. 139 (2000) (examining the political implications of senior status); Saul Brenner, The
Myth that Justices Strategically Retire, 36 THE SOC. SCI. J. 431 (1999) (concluding that
judges do not retire for political reasons); Terri Peretti & Alan Rozzi, Modern Departures
from the United States Supreme Court: Party, Pensions, or Power?, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
131 (2011-12) (analyzing why justices in the modern era have left the Court); Peverill
Squire, Politics and Personal Factors in Retirement from the United States Supreme Court,
10 POL. BEHAV. 180 (1988) (finding that pension benefits and infirmities are the two
strongest predictions of retirement and that activity on the bench, such as opinion writing,
portends continued service).
7 Madden, supra note 5, at 1155.
8 Myers, supra note 3, at 46.(describing 35 justices to have left the Court but not
counting Justices O’Connor, Souter, or Stevens).
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Before 1869, Supreme Court justices could only leave the Court by
death or resignation.9 Indeed, from 1801 to 1868, of the twenty-four
justices who left the bench, four resigned and twenty died.10 Hoping to
spur older justices to leave the Court before infirmity struck, Congress
passed The Judiciary Act of 1869, enabling justices to retire from the
Bench.11 The Act’s “retirement provision had mixed success in enticing
justices to relinquish their seats on the Supreme Court.”12
Fifty years later, Congress created the framework for today’s senior
justices. First, Congress enabled lower Article III judges to assume senior
status,13 and, in 1937, Congress enacted similar provisions for justices,
permitting each to assume senior status while retaining his or her Article
III commission.14 The Retirement Act of 1954 followed, permitting judges
aged sixty-five with fifteen years of judicial service to retire.15 Thirty
years later in 1984 Congress adopted the Rule of Eighty, which permits
judges to retire on a sliding scale of age and service; those who serve at
least ten to fifteen years and are between sixty-five and seventy years old
may retire, provided their age and years of service total eighty.16 Five
years later in 1989, Congress required that senior judges certify that they
have completed at least a quarter of their regular workloads in order to
receive the same salary increases of active Article III judges, and since
1996, Congress permitted extra work from previous years to carry-over to
satisfy certification for any single year.17 Since the 1954 Act, every
member of the Supreme Court has retired or resigned with the exception
of Chief Justice Rehnquist.18
Today, this statutory system, cobbled together over 150 years, offers
a variety of choices for justices preparing to leave fulltime Article III
service. Upon reaching the Rule of Eighty, a justice may retire from
judicial service entirely. This is the “retirement on salary” option.19
Retired justices receive an annual pension equivalent to their salary during
9

Madden, supra note 5, at 1156.
Madden, supra note 5, at 1155.
11 Madden, supra note 5, at 1156.
12 Madden, supra note 5, at 1156
13 Mary L. Clark, Judicial Retirement and Return to Practice, 60 CATH. U. L. REV.
841, 862 (2011).
14 Madden, supra note 5, at 1157.
15 Madden, supra note 5, at 1157.
16 Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of
Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 514 (2005); Clark, supra note 13, at
863.
17 Madden, supra note 5, at 1157 n.79.
18 Madden, supra note 5, at 1158.
19 Clark, supra note 13, at 863; David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges
Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453, 460 (2006-07).
10
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their last year of judicial service and may return to law practice or other
gainful work.20 On the other hand, a justice may assume senior status;
continue to hear cases; and receive the same salary as if in active service,
including regular pay increases.21 Taking senior status does not allow a
senior justice to practice law, but it does create a vacancy, which the
president and Senate may fill via nomination and confirmation.22
In order to remain eligible for salary increases and serve by
designation, the Chief Justice of the United States must designate and
assign senior justices, and those senior justices must satisfy a minimum
workload requirement.23 Because the Chief Justice must assign a senior
justice to a Circuit Court, he or she has the power to prevent a senior
colleague from sitting on a lower panel by not designating the justice to
serve on a particular—or any—court of appeals. For example, Chief
Justice Earl Warren refused to designate and assign senior Justice Charles
Whittaker to hear cases on lower courts, telling a colleague, “Tell [Justice
Whittaker] that I never could get him to make up his mind, and I’ll be
damned if I will let him do that to me again trying cases. So the answer is
no.”24 Another option to fulfill the senior status obligations with nonjudicial work would enable other justices so prevented still to satisfy their
statutory obligations and qualify for a pay raise.
To satisfy the workload requirement, senior justices “must annually
perform at least the same amount of work that an active judge would
perform in three months, or other work for the courts as specified in detail
under the statutory scheme.”25 The other work specified in the statutory
scheme permits justices to perform non-judicial duties to satisfy their
obligations. Senior judges must work “equal to the full-time work of an
employee of the judicial branch,” can do so through non-judicial work,
and may combine courtroom and non-courtroom duties to meet the
statutory minimums.26 Thus senior justices enjoy extreme flexibility
regarding the work they perform to satisfy their statutory obligations.
Recent examples include Justice O’Connor’s service on the Iraq Study
Group27 and Chief Justice Burger’s time as chairman of the commission
planning the bicentennial celebration of the United States Constitution.28
Despite this broad understanding of service during senior status, justices
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Clark, supra note 13, at 863.
Clark, supra note 13, at 863.
Clark, supra note 13, at 863.
Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 461.
Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 483.
McElroy & Dorf, supra note 4, at 87 n.25.
Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 462.
McElroy & Dorf, supra note 4, at 114.
Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 500 n.332.
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may not return to sit on the Supreme Court, as the statute does not permit
the designation and assignment of senior justices to the Supreme Court.29
Senior justices, therefore, do not vote on certiorari petitions, hear oral
arguments, or, it seems, eat regularly with the active justices.30
Senior justices, as a perk of their status, may maintain offices
anywhere in the country. Justice O’Connor has chambers in the Supreme
Court—the first senior justice to do so since Justices Brennan and
Powell.31 Others kept chambers in the Thurgood Marshall Federal
Judiciary Building near Union Station in Washington, D.C.32 Justice
White remained in this building until 2001, when he moved to Denver and
used that courthouse’s office of the Circuit Justice.33 Today, Justice Souter
has chambers in New Hampshire.34 Senior justices therefore can and do
leave Washington and the Supreme Court building. Despite being able to
maintain chambers wherever they choose, senior justices are permitted
only a single clerk for a given year,35 three fewer than their usual allotment
but commensurate with their reduced workloads. Table 1 below
summarizes the employment differences between active, senior, and
retired judges and justices.

29 Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 513. There have been recent calls for senior justices
to sit by designation on the Supreme Court to replace a recused Justice. See, e.g., Lisa T.
McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, supra note 4; Rebekah Saidman-Krauss, A Second Sitting:
Assessing the Constitutionality and Desirability of Allowing Retired Supreme Court
Justices to Fill Recusal-based Vacancies on the Bench, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 253 (2011).
Despite this statutory disability, Justice Douglas attempted to sit on the Court after his
retirement and even drafted and printed an opinion in Buckley v. Valeo following Justice
Stevens’ confirmation as his replacement. Myers, supra note 3, at 56.
30 David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1417, 1438 (2006).
31 David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden
Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397, 1465 n.391 (2005).
32 Stras & Scott, supra note 31, at 1465.
33 Myers, supra note 3, at 56.
34 Tony Mauro, Souter Returns to the Granite State, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 17, 2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PubArticleSCM.jsp?id=1202433117459.
35 Stras, supra note 30, at 1445 n.155.

292

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

Active
Status
Non-diminishing
Compensation
Creation of Judicial
Vacancy
Subsequent Increases in
Compensation
Exemption from Federal
Taxes on Annual
Compensation
Freedom to Earn Nonjudicial Income
Judicial Chambers, Clerks,
& Administrative Support
Discretion Regarding
Caseload Number, Type, &
Calendar
Participation in Court
Governance, En Banc
Decisions

[Vol. 11:285

Article III Judges
Senior
Retirement
Status

✓

✓

✓

✗

✓

✓

✓

✓

✗

✗

✓

✓

✗

✗

✓

✓

✓

✗

✗

✓

N/A

✓

✗

✗

Table 1: The Differences between Active, Senior, and Retired
Article III Judicial Service36
B. Sitting By Designation
Of the thirty-eight justices to retire from the Bench, eleven have
served on lower courts by designation. Justice Van Devanter was the first
to do so, assuming senior status soon after the Retirement Act’s 1937
passage, although he only oversaw two trials on the Southern District of
New York while on senior status.37 Justice Souter is the most recent
Justice to assume senior status and sit by designation, hearing cases on the

36

Yoon, supra note 16, at 511.
See United States v. Graham, 102 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1939); United States v. Moore,
101 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 664 (1939).
37
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First Circuit exclusively.38 Justice Stevens, the most recent justice to retire
from the Bench, has yet to hear a case on a lower court.39 This section
covers the history of the eleven justices who heard cases by designation,
offering a brief portrait of their senior service on the District and Appellate
Courts of the United States.
1. Justice Willis Van Devanter
As mentioned, Justice Van Devanter, after assuming senior status,
served as a trial judge in New York. He heard two cases, one in January
and another in February of 1938.40 The Second Circuit confirmed his
power to preside over the case as a senior justice in United States v.
Moore.41 Justice Van Devanter, however, sat on no appellate panels and
would die in 1941.42 Given that he never sat on a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals, Justice Van Devanter’s brief service as a District
Judge will not inform this essay’s analysis of retired justices’ appellate
service.
2. Justice Stanley F. Reed
Justice Reed had a very prolific career as a senior justice, sitting
exclusively in Washington, D.C. He sat on panels for the D.C. Circuit and
the Court of Claims, the appellate division of which was later folded into
the Federal Circuit, and served as a Special Master for the Supreme
Court.43 Justice Reed heard cases for thirteen years, from his assumption
of senior status in 1957 until 1970.44 When he died ten years later,45 he
had heard 191 cases, authored 33 opinions, and composed 10 dissents
during his senior service.46

38

See, e.g., United States v. Christi, 682 F.3d 138 (1st Cir. 2012).
Justice Stevens has, however, published two books: (1) JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE
CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR (1st ed. 2011) and (2) JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX
AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION (1st ed. 2014).
40 Myers, supra note 3, at 49.
41 101 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1939).
42 Willis Van Devanter, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.s
upremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/willis-van-devanter-19111937/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
43 Myers, supra note 3, at 50.
44 Myers, supra note 3, at 50.
45 Myers, supra note 3, at 50.
46 See, e.g., Brandenfels v. Day, 316 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Atchison, Topekand
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 18, 20 (1962); Johnson v. Geffen, 294 F.2d
197 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Reed, J., dissenting).
39
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3. Justice Harold H. Burton
Justice Burton, like Justice Reed, remained in Washington, D.C. for
his entire senior career. He sat exclusively on the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, and in the three and a half years he served on that court,47 he
heard sixty-three cases, wrote eight opinions, concurred once, and
dissented three times.48 Two years after his last sitting, Justice Burton died
in October 1964.49
4. Justice Tom C. Clark
Justice Clark served as a senior justice for ten years,50 and in that
time heard 397 cases. He heard three cases as a district judge and was twice
reversed by the Ninth Circuit.51 As a panel member for the Eighth Circuit,
however, he later wrote an opinion disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion that reversed his district court decision, thereby creating a Circuit
split.52 In resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit and adopted the rationales Justice Clark’s used in his Eighth Circuit
opinion, vindicating his decisions at the trial and appellate level.53 In all,
he would sit on each Court of Appeals that existed at that time, including
the United State Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Federal
Circuit’s forerunner, and write 72 opinions and two dissents as a senior
justice.54

47

Myers, supra note 3, at 51.
See, e.g., Stevan v. Union Trust Co. of D.C., 316 F.2d 687, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(Burton, J., concurring); Campbell v. United States, 289 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Lord
v. Lencshire House, Ltd., 272 F.2d 557, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Burton, J., dissenting).
49 Harold H. Burton, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.
supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/willis-van-devanter-19111937/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
50 Myers, supra note 3, at 48.
51 Myers, supra note 3, at 53.
52 Myers, supra note 3, at 54.
53 Myers, supra note 3, at 54.
54 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. U. S., 552 F.2d 302, 303 (9th Cir.
1977); Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 232 (1st Cir. 1977); Am. Intern. Trading Co.
v. Bagley, 536 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1976); Kirby v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583, 584 (4th Cir.
1976); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 930 (3d Cir. 1976);
United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir. 1976); Heber Val. Milk Co. v. Butz,
503 F.2d 96, 97 (10th Cir. 1974); Reyes v. Sec’y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 476 F.2d 910,
911 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Driscoll v. Nw. Nat. Bank of St. Paul, 484 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir.
1973); Alpha Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 463 F.2d 1098, 1099 (C.C.P.A. 1972);
J. A. Jones Const. Co. v. Englert Eng’g Co., 438 F.2d 3, 4 (6th Cir. 1971).
48
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5. Justice Potter Stewart
Justice Stewart served as a senior justice for nearly four and a half
years, although he only heard cases from 1982 to 1984.55 In those two
years, he sat on the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, hearing
forty-four cases and writing nine opinions.56 He also dissented twice in
the same case.57 Later, the Seventh Circuit reheard this case en banc58—
without Justice Stewart—and ruled along Justice Stewart’s line of
reasoning. The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari and reversed
the Seventh Circuit.59 Justice Stewart’s forceful dissents, thus, came to
naught.
6. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Justice Powell left the Supreme Court in the summer of 1987 and
began hearing cases on senior status that fall.60 He worked exclusively in
the South, sitting on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits and maintaining an
office in the Supreme Court until 1996.61 For four cases, Justice Powell
heard oral argument but did not participate in their decisions; the
remaining two judges concurred in the outcome, so no additional action
was required to render an opinion.62 In total, Justice Powell participated
in 116 published and 157 unpublished cases, writing 32 published
opinions, 1 unpublished opinion, and 1 dissent.63 Interestingly, Justice
Powell participated in far more unpublished dispositions than any other
senior justice.

55

Myers, supra note 3, at 48, 55.
See, e.g., Nat. Post Office, Mailhandlers, Watchmen Messengers & Group Leaders
Div., Laborers Intern. Union of North Am., AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 751
F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1985); Brine v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 745 F.2d 100
(1st Cir. 1984); ITT Grinnell Corp. v. Donovan, 744 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1984); Stewart v.
C.I.R., 714 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1983); Owen v. Lash, 682 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1982).
57 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
58 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984).
59 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
60 Myers, supra note 3, at 55.
61 Id.; see, e.g., Raymond, Colesar, Glapsy & Huss, P.C. v. Allied Capital Corp., 961
F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1992); Rice v. Branigar Org., Inc., 922 F.2d 788 (11th Cir. 1991).
62 See, e.g., Sargent v. Waters, 71 F.3d 158 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Justice Powell heard oral
arguments but did not participate in the decision of this case. The decision is filed by a
quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).”).
63 See, e.g., Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Heinsohn, 72 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1995); Alexander
v. Mayor & Council of Town of Cheverly, Md., 953 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1992); AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1992) (Powell, J., dissenting).
56
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7. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
Justice Brennan assumed senior status in the summer of 1990 after
suffering a likely stroke.64 Despite living seven more years, Justice
Brennan would only sit for three cases on the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals. In those cases, Justice Brennan wrote one opinion, joined a
unanimous panel in another, and joined a per curiam, unpublished
opinion.65
8. Justice Thurgood Marshall
Justice Marshall had a short senior career. He assumed senior status
October 1, 1991 and passed away in late January of 1993.66 In those
sixteen months, Justice Marshall sat on the Federal Circuit and his old
court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.67 On doctor’s orders, Justice
Marshall canceled a visit to a Baltimore sitting of the Fourth Circuit, which
senior Justice Powell had arranged.68 In total, Justice Marshall heard eight
cases, wrote one opinion, and joined seven majorities.69 His service on the
Federal Circuit resulted in two unpublished dispositions.70
9. Justice Byron R. White
Assuming senior status in 1993, Justice White would hear cases on
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits over his
senior judicial career.71 Justice White maintained chambers in the
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building before moving to Denver
in 2001, although he had stopped hearing cases in 1999.72 In the six years
he heard arguments, Justice White participated in fifty-one cases, authored
64 Myers, supra note 3, at 55; Seth Stern, Inside Brennan’s Post-Retirement Chambers,
THE JUSTICE BRENNAN BLOG, http://justicebrennan.com/blog/?p=782 (last visited Apr. 8,
2013).
65 See Tenngasco Exch. Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 952 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Kanuth v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Fenty, 950
F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
66 Myers, supra note 3, at 48.
67 See, e.g., Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1992);
Doko Farms v. United States, 956 F.2d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
68 Myers, supra note 3, at 55.
69 See, e.g., Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Morgan v. United States, 968 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1992).
70 Krause v. Dep’t of Air Force, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27973 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 26,
1991) (per curiam); Schwarman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27973
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 26, 1991) (per curiam).
71 See, e.g., Alpha Epsilon Phi Tau Chapter Hous. Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 114 F.3d
840 (9th Cir. 1997); Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1996); Todd v. AIG
Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995); Beard v. City of Northglenn, Colo., 24 F.3d
110 (10th Cir. 1994).
72 Myers, supra note 3, at 55–56.
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eighteen opinions, concurred twice, and dissented once.73 He also
participated in twenty-three cases that resulted in unpublished opinions.74
10. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
Since assuming senior status upon the confirmation of her successor
in 2006, Justice O’Connor has maintained chambers in the Supreme
Court.75 She has launched a civics education drive76 and sat by designation
across the nation. With the exception of the two circuit courts based in
Washington, D.C.77 Justice O’Connor has served on every Circuit Court
of Appeals.78 As of December 31, 2014, Justice O’Connor has written
twenty-two opinions and dissented once out of the eighty-three cases she
heard that resulted in published opinions. In addition, Justice O’Connor
wrote eight unpublished opinions out of a total ninety-three cases she
heard that were similarly unpublished.79
11. Justice David H. Souter
Justice Souter’s retirement has been far more localized than Justice
O’Connor’s. Since assuming senior status in 2009, Justice Souter has
continued to “render substantial judicial service as an Associate Justice,”
per the terms of his retirement letter, which cited the statutory provisions

73 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 144 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (White, J.,
dissenting); Pulia v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1995); TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36
F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 1994) (White, J., concurring).
74 See, e.g., Allen v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6693 (9th Cir. Apr.
8, 19917).
75 Myers, supra note 3, at 48.
76 See What is iCivics?, ICIVICS, http://www.icivics.org/About (last visited Apr. 8,
2013).
77 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals may dissuade visiting judges and even senior
justices. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1664 (2003) (“[A]bsent a grave emergency, the [D.C. Circuit]
court will not use visiting judges to decides cases on [its] docket.”).
78 See, e.g., Cole v. United States Atty. Gen., 712 F.3d 517 (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013);
In re New Jersey Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d 451 (3d Cir. 2012); Lin Xing Jiang v. Holder,
639 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Cameron, 573 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Douglas, 569 F.3d 523 (5th Cir.
2009); Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Stem, 519 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2008);
McGill v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 285 F. App’x 765 (1st Cir. 2008); Adelphia Business
Solutions, Inc. v. Abnos, 482 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Rosas, 486 F.3d
374 (8th Cir. 2007); J & G Sales Ltd. v. Truscott, 473 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2007).
79 See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 354 Fed. Appx. 254 (6th Cir. 2009). One case
involved a certified Question the Supreme Court of Virginia. It is included in this tally.
Dunlap v. Cottman Transmissions Sys., LLC, 539 F. App’x 69, 70 (4th Cir. 2013) certified
question answered sub nom. Dunlap v. Cottman Transmission Sys., LLC, 131318, 2014
WL 782853 (Va. Feb. 27, 2014).
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permitting senior service.80 Since 2009, Justice Souter has maintained
chambers in New Hampshire81 and sat exclusively on the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, his first federal appointment. He has heard 193 cases
with published opinions and 46 more with unpublished opinions. In these
few years, he has authored forty published and thirty-five unpublished
opinions for the Boston-based court.82
C. Conclusion
Senior justices work where they will and serve as long as they would
like or their health permits. They choose to remain in Washington, D.C.
or return to the regions where they lived before joining the Supreme Court.
Their service depends on their health and longevity. In sum, their senior
careers are varied.
Having briefly examined the senior service of the eleven justices to
assume senior status from the Supreme Court and sit by designation on
lower courts from an historical perspective, this essay now turns to a
focused analysis of the judicial work of each.
II. THEORIES OF SENIOR JUSTICES’ INFLUENCE
Judging and judges are viewed through many lenses. To some,
judging can be a lonely process.83 To others, it can be a collaborative
process.84 Still others rest decision-making on an informed “hunch.”85
Acourt can have politically-charged epochs as well as less political eras.86
Judging can be viewed “attitudinally” or “strategically,”87 and decisions
can seem blatantly political or technocratically divorced from everyday
effects. Whatever matrices ought to be used when studying the judiciary
to determine what factors influences judges and how judges influence one
another and the law, are questions scholars have, are, and continue to
wrestle with and explain. This essay puts much of that scholarship88 aside
80 Letter from David H. Souter to Barack H. Obama, May 1, 2009, available at:
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/DHSLetter.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
81 Mauro, supra note 34.
82 See, e.g., Feliz v. MacNeill, 493 F. App’x 128 (1st Cir. 2012); EMC Corp. v. Arturi,
655 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2011).
83 Patricia Wald, Comment: Some Real-Life Observations About Judging, 26 IND. L.
REV. 173 (1992).
84 Edwards, supra note 77, at 1646.
85 J.C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274, 282 (1929).
86 Edwards, supra note 77, at 1648.
87 Edwards, supra note 77, at 1652.
88 Such scholarship includes judicial introspection like the citations above and Judge
Frank Coffin’s ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING (1994) and THE WAYS OF
A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH (1980), as well as political
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in examining how senior justices perform when sitting by designation on
circuit courts.
Instead, this essay looks at the careers of these senior justices and
asks what distinguishes a senior justice? Are they essentially “super”
circuit court judges? In other words, do they outperform active and senior
court judges? Do any senior justices stand out amongst their peers? What
anomalies appear in analyzing their careers versus those of active judges?
Versus senior judges? Versus active Supreme Court justices? And Versus
other senior justices? The section below posits the most readily apparent
hypotheses to be expected when undertaking such an examination. The
essay then proceeds to present the collected data before analyzing it.
A. Conventional Wisdoms
A number of theories and proposals come to mind when studying the
careers of senior justices. Are senior justices freed from the weight of the
Supreme Court and thus more likely to express themselves in a panel
decision? Is the necessity to get only one panel member vote for a majority
produce the justice’s true voice, perhaps as seen in a dissent, compared
with more compromised majority opinions resulting from the necessity to
garner four justices to join on the Supreme Court? Are senior justices
asked to write more important or mundane opinions as panel members?
Does the reduction to a single clerk from four lead to fewer opinions?
These are just a few of the questions that come to mind when
beginning to investigate the careers of senior justices. But questions
specifically about senior justices’ influence on appellate panels and on the
Supreme Court leap to the forefront. This essay focuses on two
hypotheses.
First, it seems that senior justices would command respect among
circuit judges. This respect should mean that senior justices wield more
persuasive power amongst panel members. Indicators to illustrate this
hypothesis should include: fewer dissents by senior justices than a typical
circuit court judge or perhaps a higher percentage of authored panel
opinions as compared to other circuit judges. This hypothesis presumes
collegiality on any given panel,89 and the importance of deliberation.90

science examinations of the courts too numerous to be cited and hybrids like Frank B. Cross
& Emerson H. Tiller’s, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE. L. J. 2155 (1998).
89 For a primer on collegiality and the appellate courts, see Edwards, supra note 77.
90 Judge Edwards agrees. Edwards, supra note 77 at 1646 (arguing for collegiality and
describing the deliberative process on a collegial court as “until a final judgment is reached,
judges participate as equals in the deliberative process – each judicial voice carries weight,
because each judge is willing to hear and respond to differing positions. The mutual aim
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Second, with their unique experience on the High Court, senior
justices should be better able to anticipate what future courts, most
importantly the Supreme Court, will do. These justices, therefore, should
be reversed less often than typical circuit court judges and be able to signal
the Court to take notice and follow their lead. This hypothesis assumes
that senior justices understand the shifts in the law that may result from
their departure from active service on the Court and can predict, account
for, and neutralize those changes91 in their appellate opinions.
III. OBSERVATIONS: SERVICE ON THE LOWER COURTS
When retired justices sit on circuit courts, they serve on regular threemember panels. It is possible to compare the justices against each other
as well as active and senior circuit judges by analyzing the outcomes of
the decisions and the justices’ respective positions in each case. Part III
proceeds in two sections. First, it presents this essay’s methodology.
Second, it examines the data of the senior justices’ service, comparing
their service against one another as well as representative active and senior
court of appeals judges by measuring the instances when justices were in
the majority, authored the opinion, concurred, dissented, were appealed
and granted certiorari, and were reversed or affirmed by the Supreme
Court. It also compares and analyzes the data presented and explores
trends, outliers, and curiosities.
This section finds that senior justices have unique service records and
stand apart from their former peers and those judges who share panels with
them. It also demonstrates that senior justices possess no additional or
unique insight, as compared with their fellow appellate court judges, into
the future actions of the Supreme Court, a result contrary to the natural
assumption that they would possess this insight.
A. Methodology
Comprehensive database searches produced the dataset used in this
research. Every case a senior justice participated in was catalogued, as
were the cases’ procedural postures and the justice’s position on each
panel. This procedure produced a complete dataset from which to base
observations, analyses, and comparisons.

of the judges is to apply the law and find the right answer.”). Judge Posner disagrees. See
RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008) (“Judicial deliberation is overrated.”).
91 Judge Posner described the dangers of those changes when accounting for the
Supreme Court’s shift following the departure of Justice O’Connor and the arrival of
Justice Alito. He wrote, “if changing judges changes law, it is not even clear what law is.”
Posner, supra note 90, at 1.
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With the few exceptions noted below, this essay does not include
unpublished opinions. Because unpublished opinions do not have
precedential weight except with regard to the doctrine of law of the case
and claim and issue preclusion,92 their citation is frowned upon.93 For the
purposes of this essay, they are tallied and analyzed only to demonstrate
the overall productivity of senior justices. For example, Justice Powell
heard 273 cases while on senior status, however, fully 157 (57.5%) of
those were unpublished. Comparing Justice Powell’s overall work rate
without this data against Justice Clark, who heard 404 cases (1.7% of
which were unpublished), would have been unfair to Justice Powell’s
service and resulted in incomplete comparative analysis.
In addition cases vacated en banc94 and panel decisions certifying
questions to state supreme courts95 were not counted. Vacated opinions
are legally void, while certified questions ask state supreme courts to
clarify the law for a federal court. However, cases that the Supreme Court
heard and vacated were counted, as they illustrate the frequency with
which the justice incorrectly identified and applied the law.96 In essence,
panel decisions that the Supreme Court vacated are counted as reversals.
Relatedly, cases superseded by statue97 or overturned or reversed at a much
later date98 are not counted against a senior justice. Only direct reversals
are included. Court of Claims cases, where the court notes that the other
panel judges concur, are counted as if the sitting senior justice was in the
majority, not concurring. This is because the Court of Claims, as an
institution, has treated authored opinions in this manner and because no
separate concurrence appears.99
The database of cases involving Justices O’Connor and Souter
contains cases from the time each justice assumed senior status until
December 31, 2014. The data on each justice must be accepted with some

92

See, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a).
See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 32.1.
94 See. e.g., Chapman v. United States, 541 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1976) vacated en banc,
575 F.2d 147, 151 (7th Cir. 1978) (“We note that the panel decision no longer stands as a
precedent on the duty issue, because the effect of granting the rehearing in banc was to
vacate the panel opinions.”).
95 See, e.g., Osterweil v. Bartlett, 706 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2013) certified question
accepted, 20 N.Y. 3d 1058 (2013).
96 See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 425 U.S. 929(1976).
97 United States v. Ellis, 951 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1991), superseded by statute as stated
in United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2000).
98 See, e.g., Lowe v. Aarco-Am., Inc., 536 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1976) overruled by
N.A.A.C.P. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992) and overruled by
Autry v. Nw. Premium Services, Inc., 144 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 1998).
99 See, e.g., Heinz v. United States, 312 F.2d 759, 764 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
93
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skepticism, as petitions for certiorari and rehearing may be pending.
Overall, however, the nine and five years of service each justice has
provided the Circuit Courts, respectively, contain enough cases to form
the basis for useful analyses and comparisons with each other, with active
justices of the Supreme Court, with prior senior justices of the Supreme
Court, with active circuit judges, and with senior circuit judges.
With few exceptions, the author personally identified and collected
the data presented. To better compare senior justices with active and senior
circuit judges, an average or composite active and senior circuit court
judge was generated. To do so, the author selected a single active and
senior judge from each circuit and tallied the cases he or she heard, as
well as the opinions, dissent, and concurrences he or she authored,
mirroring the process used to generate the data of the senior justices’
service on the appellate courts.100 The selection includes circuit judges
picked from across the ideological spectrum, as determined by their
appointing president. Care was taken to pick judges with varying lengths
of tenure and to ensure that those senior judges chosen were still hearing
cases. The cases tallied covered the period from October 1, 2011 to
September 30, 2012, the same timeframe the Administrative Office of
United States Courts (AOUSC) uses to organize its data pools. In addition,
this essay’s data pool includes unpublished and published opinions, in
order to present a complete picture of a senior judge’s work, given the high
percentage of cases that go unpublished today. In addition, the author
gathered and tallied senior circuit judges’ total caseloads for this period,
noting the judges’ position on each panel (i.e. opinion author, majority
voter, dissenter, etc.)—the same procedure used for senior justices. This
procedure was not repeated for active judges, however, because each
active judge’s dataset over the year in question was too large for a timely
quantification and analysis. Finally, where noted, the essays relied on the
AOUSC’s overall data on the courts.
B. Data Analyses and Findings
This section presents the accumulated research data. It analyses the
number of cases each justice heard, how many opinions, concurrences, and

100 The then-active judges selected are Boudin, Pooler, Chagares, Wilkinson, Clement,
Cole, Wood, Colloton, Tallman, Kelly, Tjoflat, Garland, and O’Malley on the First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and
Federal Circuits respectively. The senior judges are Stahl, Leval, Barry, Hamilton, Wiener,
Merritt, Ripple, Beam, Hug, Seymour, Cox, Silberman, Clevenger on the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal
Circuits respectively. Senior Judges Leval, Ripple, Seymour, and Clevenger all sat by
designation on other circuits. These cases were included in the dataset.
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dissents each authored, as well as the per curiam opinions produced by
panels that included a senior justice. Similar tallies for select active and
senior judges generated an average active and senior judge for easy
comparison. Using the data gathered, this section compares the judicial
service of senior justices with each other, with active Supreme Court
justices, with active circuit judges, and with senior circuit judges.
i. Cases Heard
Justice Clark was the hardest working senior justice in terms of
number of cases heard. In his thirteen years, he heard 404 cases. Justice
Brennan’s three cases, on the other hand, represent the fewest number of
cases heard by any senior justice who sat by designation on a Circuit
Court. Table 2 and Chart 1 illustrate the disparate number of cases senior
justices took on during their senior tenures on Circuit Courts. The table
and chart include published and unpublished cases to show how each
justice measures against his or her peers.
Justice
Clark
Powell
Souter
Reed
O’Connor
White
Burton
Stewart
Marshall
Brennan
Totals

Published
Opinions
397
116
193
191
83
51
63
44
8
2
1148

Unpublished
Opinions
7
157
46
0
93
23
0
0
2
1
329

Totals
404
273
239
191
176
74
63
44
10
3
1477

Table 2: Cases Heard by Senior Justices on Courts of Appeals
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Unpublished Ops.
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Chart 1: Published and Unpublished Opinions by Senior Justices on
Courts of Appeals by Percentage of Their Total Opinions Written
The numbers show first that many justices hear a considerable
number of cases on senior status. While Justice Clark’s 404 exceeds the
others, and amounts to 27.4% of all senior justices’ cases, Justice Powell
heard a hefty 273 cases, or 18.5% of all senior justices’ cases. Justice
Souter has now heard 239 cases, while Justices Reed and O’Connor round
out the top five, heaving heard 191 and 176 cases, respectively. The data
also show the recent rise in unpublished opinions, with the first four senior
justices together producing seven unpublished opinions in total—all from
Justice Clark—while justices retiring since 1987 took part in 322
unpublished opinions. Indeed, unpublished opinions accounted for 1.7%
of Justice Clark’s cases, 57.5% of Justice Powell’s, 33.3% of Justice
Brennan’s, 20.0% of Justice Marshall’s docket, 31.1% of Justice White’s,
52.8% of Justice O’Connor’s, and 19.2% of Justice Souter’s cases. The
dramatic rise in unpublished opinions across the judicial system likely
accounts for its concomitant rise in the number of unpublished opinions
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senior justices joined and wrote. Indeed unpublished opinions accounted
for 81.4% of circuit opinions in 2012.101
When compared to the number of years each justice heard opinions
while on senior status, the data show some particularly hard working
justices. For example, Justices Clark, Powell, and Souter all averaged over
forty cases in a year, over half of the 2012 Supreme Court caseload.102 The
average across the senior justice dataset per year was a manageable
twenty-two cases, while the median was eighteen cases in a year. Chart 2
presents this data.

Cases Per Year
Souter

48

O'Connor

20

White

19

Marshall

8

Brennan

3

Powell

46

Stewart

10

Clark

40

Burton

18

Reed

15
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20

30

40

50

60

Chart 2: Cases Senior Justices Hear Per Year
When compared to the seventy-seven argued cases in the Supreme
Court’s October 2012 Term,103 both the mean (twenty-two) and median
(eighteen) are around a quarter of the Supreme Court’s current caseload,
101 Thomas Hogan, Annual Report of the Director 2012: Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Table S-3, available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/tables/S03sep12.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
102 Chief Justice John Roberts, 2013 Year End Report, Appendix: Workload of the
Courts (2014) (“During the 2012 Term, 77 cases were argued and 76 were disposed of in
73 signed opinions . . . .”).
103 Id.
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as the statute authorizing senior status requires a senior justice reach to be
eligible for salary increases.104 The data also show that Justices Marshall,
Stewart, and Reed heard relatively few cases a year, while Justice
Brennan’s three cases in his single year of service were the likely result of
his ill-health.
In comparison, 162 active and 88 senior circuit judges disposed of
35,095 cases on the merits from October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2012.105
Circuit judges heard 7115 oral arguments in this same time sitting on an
average of 56 panels each.106 The composite active judge on average sat
on forty-eight cases where he wrote an opinion, concurrence, or dissent.107
Although not a perfect match, because these data do not include all cases
they heard because the universe of data proved unmanageable, the data
demonstrate that active judges write in more than double the cases an
average senior justice hears. Senior judges, on the other hand, heard, on
average 145 cases from October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2012.108 This
dataset, however, is possibly skewed because senior Judge Hamilton heard
661 cases in this span, although he only wrote in seven of them.109
Removing him from the dataset, the average senior judge heard 102 cases,
with Judge Silberman on the D.C. Circuit hearing the fewest at 22.110 This
shows that senior judges hear far more cases than senior justices, fully 6.5
and 4.6 times more cases, with and without Judge Hamilton’s total
number. The data also demonstrate that senior justices hear far fewer cases
than active circuit judges. Chart 3 illustrates the differences.

104

See Madden, supra note 5, at 1157 n.79; McElroy & Dorf, supra note 4, at 87 n.25
Thomas Hogan, Annual Report of the Director 2012: Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Statistical Tables – U.S. Courts of Appeals, available at:
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/B01Sep12
.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2013); Federal Court Management Statistics: September 2012,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, available at: http://www.uscou
rts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2012/ap
peals-fcms-profiles-september-2012.pdf&page=1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). I spent a
significant amount of time trying to break down this data further to determine the cases
heard by senior judges, as well. As first glance it seems like simple mathematical analysis
to determine this figure from the data tables. However, these attempts were futile, as more
specific data is needed to break down the percentages of cases heard by senior judges,
including what the Administrative Office of the United States Courts means when it says
75.7% of all merits cases were decided by active judges. Id. This is why the essay uses a
composite active and senior circuit judge.
106 Hogan supra note 105; Federal Court Management Statistics, supra note 105.
107 See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2012).
108 See. e.g., Alpine Glass, Inc., v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 686 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2012).
109 See, e.g., United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2011).
110 See, e.g., Gunderson Lutheran Med. Center, Inc., v. Sebelius, 666 F.3d 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
105
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Average Cases Heard Per Year
Senior Justices

22

Active Justices

77

Active Judges, writing only

48

Senior Judges, with Hamilton, J.

145

Senior Judges without Hamilton, J.
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Chart 3: Average Cases Heard per Year Compared
ii. Position on Judicial Panels
The remainder of the analyses of senior justices’ service does not
include unpublished opinions. The remaining portions of this essay focus
on the impact of the opinions and votes of each justice in senior status.
Since unpublished opinions do not have precedential weight in the circuits,
their impact is negligible. Thus, they are excluded. The essay includes
unpublished opinions for the active and senior judges studied for the
reasons offered earlier and presents the data below in four categories:
number of opinions authored, times in a panel’s majority, per curiam and
concurrences, and dissents. These four categories provide a complete
picture of each justices’ service and allow for easy comparison.
a. As Opinion Author
Although each of the eleven senior justices studied wrote opinions
for panels, the frequency with which they wrote the opinion for that panel
varies considerably. Chart 4 below presents the percentage of cases on
which the justices authored panel opinions.
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Percentage as Author
Souter
O'Connor
White
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Chart 4: Percentage Opinions Authored of Cases Heard
The data show that the senior justices authored between 12 and 36
percent of cases they heard, with Justice Brennan’s 50 percent an outlier
likely because he heard so few cases. Justice White was most likely to
author an opinion as a senior justice, while Justices Marshall and Burton
were least likely to do so. On average, senior justices authored opinions
for 24.1 percent of the cases they heard, while the median was 20.6
percent. These data show that Justices Powell and White were most likely
to write opinions, while both Justices Clark and Reed, despite taking part
in the most appellate cases, were each less likely than the average senior
justice to author a panel decision. By comparison, active Supreme Court
Justices wrote the majority opinion eight times in the 2012 term, equating
to 10.26 percent of the time.111 The average senior circuit judge authored
the panel opinion in 10 percent of the cases he heard, while the median
was 14 percent.112
111 Stat
Pack for October Term 2012, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27,2013),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SCOTUSblogStatPackOT1
21.pdf. The average includes per curiam opinions to take into account the entire term’s
docket.
112 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Holder, 673 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2012). As noted earlier, the
dataset for active judges was too large to make similar comparisons across their year of
service.
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Thus, senior justices on average, wrote the panel decision more than
twice as often as active justices and senior judges, and 1.5 times as often
as the median senior judge. Although it is beyond this essay’s scope,
perhaps the presence of a senior justice on a panel leads to more authored
opinions, as other judges defer to them. Their reduced workload may also
enable senior justices to take on a higher proportion of writing assignments
for a panel vis-à-vis the number of cases they hear. Presumably, active
circuit judges author opinions in one-third of the cases they hear. If this
assumption holds, then senior justices are writing fully 9 percent of the
time less than an active circuit judge.
In addition to the percentage each justice authored an opinion from
his or her total service, it is possible to determine how many opinions a
senior justice authored yearly. Chart 5 below compares the number of
opinions each senior justice authored in a single year. In a given year,
senior justices, on average, write 3.5 opinions. As the chart shows, Justice
Souter is the most prolific, authoring eight opinions per year, which is
more than double the average. Justice Marshall was the least prolific,
having written only one opinion in his sixteen months on senior status.113
As the chart shows, Justice Clark came in a close second to Justice Souter,
while Justice Powell, although the third most prolific opinion author,
wrote two full opinions fewer per year than Justice Clark and four fewer
than Justice Souter. Compared to the 2012 Supreme Court term, where
the average justice wrote eight majority opinions, senior justices average
just under half that total, while Justice Clark came in just below and Souter
outperformed the 2012 Court term.114
Compared to circuit judges, however, senior justices authored far
fewer majority opinions in a given year. The AOUSC averaged opinions
over active circuit judges and found that each wrote 181 opinions last
year.115 This total includes signed, unsigned, and opinions without
comment. If only signed opinions are tallied, which is the only
comparable data point to this essay’s research of senior justices’ opinions,
the average is fifty-nine opinions, or nearly seventeen times a senior
justice.116 The composite active judge wrote thirty-seven majority
opinions in the 2012 term, while the composite senior judge authored
fifteen majority opinions, representing 10.6 and four times as many
majority opinions in a calendar year than a senior justice, respectively.117
113

Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1992).
SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 111.
115 Hogan, supra note 105.
116 Hogan, supra note 105.
117 See, e.g., Bader v. Wrenn, 675 F. 3d 95 (1st Cir. 2012); SEC v. Goble, 682 F.3d 934
(11th Cir. 2012).
114
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On the other hand, Justice Souter’s average puts him just above half the
composite senior judge’s output, 21.6 percent of the composite an active
judge, and 13.6 percent of all active judges on the Courts of Appeals.

Majority Opinions Authored Per Year
Souter

8.00

O'Connor

2.44

White
Marshall
Brennan

3.00
0.75
1.00

Powell
Stewart

5.33
2.00

Clark
Burton
Reed

7.20
2.29
2.54

Chart 5: Majority Opinions Authored By Senior Justice Per
Year
Thus, senior justices—despite writing more often for any particular
panel—still produce far fewer opinions in a given year than an active or
senior circuit judge. Although their numbers are not far from those of an
active Supreme Court Justice, they are significantly lower than that of their
appellate colleagues. The discrepancy likely stems from the overall
caseload differences between senior justices and active and senior circuit
judges. Given that the statutory requirement to remain eligible for regular
wage increases is a quarter of one’s former caseload, senior justices can
much more easily obtain their mandated casework in a given year, likely
resulting in the different results observed. The fact that senior justices are
likely to write an opinion on a panel may be due to their reduced caseloads
vis-à-vis other panel members or deference shown by their fellow panel
members. The data do not prove either theory is responsible for the results.
In addition to frequency of opinion writing, it is interesting to show
how often the justices’ opinions reached the Supreme Court on petitions
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for certiorari and the subsequent results. Table 3 shows the number of
opinions each senior justice wrote, how many were petitioned for certiorari
and denied, as well as those opinions granted certiorari and affirmed or
reversed.
Justice

Opinions

Clark
Souter
Reed
Powell
O’Connor
White
Stewart
Burton
Brennan
Marshall
Totals

72
40
33
32
22
18
9
8
1
1
236

Cert.
Petitions
23
8
11
7
5
5
1
3
0
0
63

Cert.
Denied
20
8
10
7
5
5
1
2
N/A
N/A
58

Cert.
Granted
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
N/A
N/A
5

Affirmed

Reversed

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
N/A
N/A
2

2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
N/A
N/A
3

Table 3: Opinions of Senior Justices and the Supreme Court
The data show that very little of what a senior justice writes reaches
the Supreme Court, and almost no opinion is reversed. The Supreme Court
never reversed or affirmed Justices Stewart, Powell, Brennan, Marshall,
or White.118 Justices O’Connor and Souter have also yet to face reversal
or enjoy affirmation, although the Supreme Court has denied certiorari for
five of Justice O’Connor’s twenty-two and eight of Souter’s forty
opinions.119 Justice Burton saw one of his opinions granted certiorari and
affirmed.120 On the other end of the spectrum, fully a third of the opinions
Justice Reed authored resulted in petitions for certiorari, although only one

118 Justices Brennan and Marshall each only wrote a single opinion, so their sample
sizes are too small for meaningful comparison.
119 See, e.g., Mendes v. Brady, 656 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2011) (Souter, J.) cert. denied,
132 S.Ct. 1551 (2012); United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2010)
(O’Connor, J.) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1540 (2011). Their unpublished opinions were not
included in this tally, although one unpublished opinion of Justice Souter’s was denied
certiorari. United States v. Ayala-Lopez, 493 F. App’x 120 (1st Cir. 2012) cert. denied,
133 S. Ct 1459 (2013).
120 Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, 280 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1960) aff’d, 366
U.S. 731(1961).
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petition was granted and that opinion vacated.121 And out of the three
petitions for certiorari that the Supreme Court granted from Justice Clark’s
thirty opinions, the Court reversed Justice Clark twice and affirmed him
once..122
Overall, the data show that senior justices often get the law right, not
requiring Supreme Court review. Of the five cases granted certiorari,
however, the Supreme Court reversed three times, demonstrating that the
grant of certiorari predicted reversal sixty percent of the time. This
percentage corresponds with the Supreme Court’s reversal rate from the
2011 October Term, which was sixty-three percent, suggesting that senior
justices are no more or less competent as opinion authors than today’s
circuit court judges.123 In the 2012 October Term, however, senior justices
bested circuit judges who were reversed 72 percent of the time.124
Nonetheless this demonstrates that senior justices do not have any greater
insight into the Court’s reasoning nor are they better or worse at predicting
a particular result, although the stories of Justices Clark and Stewart earlier
discussed show that they can, from time to time, move the Supreme Court
or get the law “right” on a particular issue.
b. In the Majority
Senior justices can also be compared based on the number of times
their panel is affirmed or reversed, when they are in the majority but did
not write the opinion. As would be expected, the data presented below
show that of the cases appealed to the Supreme Court, few were granted
certiorari and even fewer were reversed.

121 See, e.g., Kehaya v. United States, 355 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Pub. Affairs Assocs.,
Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960) vacated, 369 U.S. 111 (1962); Porter v.
United States, 258 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
122 United States v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 534 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976) vacated and
remanded, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.
1974) aff’d sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Avrech v. Sec’y of Navy,
477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973) rev’d, 418 U.S. 676 (1974).
123 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 111, at 3.
124 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 111, at 3. The state supreme court reversal rate was
removed but the percentage of reversal remains 72. A longitudinal analysis of reversal rates
of circuit judges since 1937 may shed more light on these results, but such an analysis is
beyond this essay’s scope.
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Justice

Opinions

Clark
Souter
Reed
Powell
O’Connor
White
Burton
Stewart
Marshall
Brennan
Totals

223
149
109
67
58
28
26
26
7
1
694

Cert.
Petitions
61
30
22
17
14
8
6
8
2
0
168

Cert.
Denied
56
30
19
15
13
8
5
8
2
N/A
156

Cert.
Granted
5
N/A
3
2
1
N/A
1
N/A
N/A
N/A
12
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Affirmed

Reversed

1
N/A
1
1
0
N/A
1
N/A
N/A
N/A
4

4
N/A
2
1
1
N/A
0
N/A
N/A
N/A
8

Table 4: Cases with a Senior Justice in the Majority

Majority Appeals to USSC
Souter
O'Connor

Percent
Cert.
Denied
Percent
Affirmed

White
Marshall
Brennan
Powell

Percent
Reversed

Stewart
Clark
Burton
Reed
0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Chart 6: Disposition of Cases Appealed to the Supreme Court
(by Percentage) with a Senior Justice in the Majority
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The Supreme Court reversed nine percent of appealed panel
decisions where Justice Reed (2/22)125 was in the majority and seven
percent of Justice O’Connor’s majority votes (1/14).126 These two senior
justices experienced the highest reversal rate among senior justices. Third
was Justice Clark, whose panel majorities saw four reversals.127 These
four reversals represent the single most number of reversals, but by the
percentages they constitute merely 6.5 percent of his sixty-one cases
appealed to the Supreme Court, which is within reach of Justice Powell’s
5.9 percent reversal rate, or one128 out of seventeen cases. All other senior
justices were fortunate not to have any panels they joined reversed by the
Supreme Court. Overall, two-thirds of the cases granted certiorari were
reversed, corresponding with the 63 percent rate of reversal from the
October 2011 Supreme Court term and the 72 percent reversal rate for the
October 2012 term.129 Thus senior justices are no better nor worse than
circuit judges regarding reversal rates, suggesting that they have no special
insight into the outcomes of the Supreme Court, despite their prior careers.
c. Per Curiam Opinions and Concurrences
Courts use Per curiam, or by the court, opinions when they want to
speak anonymously or with one voice. No single judge takes credit for the
opinion, and no judge’s name is attached to the opinion. Per curiam
opinions are used either for controversial cases, like Bush v. Gore,130or
mundane or routine cases like KPMG v. Cocchi.131
In all, senior justices sat on panels producing 193 per curiam
opinions. Nearly one-quarter (23 percent) of per curiam dispositions were

125 Grumman v. United States, 294 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1961) rev’d, 370 U.S. 288
(1962); Silber v. United States, 296 F.2d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1961) rev’d, 370 U.S. 717 (1962).
126 United States v. Miller, 484 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2007) cert. granted, vacated, 552
U.S. 1089 (2008)
127 Briscoe v. Levi, 535 F.2d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1976) vacated and remanded sub nom.
Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977); Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976) rev’d,
435 U.S. 247 (1978); United States v. Lovasco, 532 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1976) rev’d, 431 U.S.
783 (1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) cert.
granted, vacated, 425 U.S. 929 (1976).
128 In re Owen, 877 F.2d 44 (11th Cir. 1989) rev’d sub nom. Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S.
305(1991).
129 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 111, at 3; SCOSTUSblog, Final Stat Pack October 2011
Term available at: http://dailywrit.com/blog/uploads/2012/06/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack
_OT11_final.pdf.
130 531 U.S. 98 (2000)
131 132 S.Ct. 23 (per curiam) (remanding to Florida state court for consideration of
whether arbitration is required for some of the claims alleged).

2015]

Semi-Retirement of Senior Supreme Court Justices

315

appealed132 to the Supreme Court, but only one opinion was granted
certiorari, representing a 2.2 percent rate. That opinion came from a D.C.
Circuit panel that senior Justice Reed sat on, and the Supreme Court
affirmed.133
It is worth noting that many of the unpublished opinions not
presented here were disposed per curiam, potentially accounting for the
drop in per curiam opinions from the time of Justice Clark’s senior service
to Justice Souter’s, with unpublished opinions taking the place of per
curiam dispositions today. Table 5 below presents the data. Of note,
panels featuring either Justice Reed, Burton, or Clark accounted for 84.9
percent of all published per curiam cases in the dataset.

Justice
Clark
Reed
Burton
Powell
Stewart
Souter
O’Connor
White
Brennan
Marshall
Totals

Per
Curiam
Opinions
100
39
25
13
7
4
3
2
0
0
193

Cert.
Petitions

Cert.
Denied

Cert.
Granted

Affirmed

Reversed

21
10
8
3
1
2
0
0
N/A
N/A
45

21
9
8
3
1
2
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
44

N/A
1
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1

N/A
1
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0

Table 5: Total Per Curiam Opinions
Concurrences, on the other hand, were unlikely occurrences
according to the dataset. In fact, eight senior justices never concurred.
Indeed, Justice Burton, one of the three Justices to concur with a panel’s
decision, did so only once and without opinion.134 Justice Powell wrote

132 See, e.g., Harrison v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 890 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam) cert. denied Harrison v. Rollins, 495 U.S. 920 (1990); Smith v. Bordenkircher, 671
F.2d 986 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) cert. denied Smith v. Sowders, 459 U.S. 848 (1982).
133 Hutcheson v. United States, 285 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per curiam) aff’d, 369
U.S. 599 (1962).
134 Stevan v. Union Trust Company of D.C., 316 F.2d 687, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(Burton, J., concurring without opinion).
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three concurrences during his senior tenure.135 Parties appealed one of
these three, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.136 Finally, Justice
White authored two concurrences, one on the Tenth Circuit in 1994,137
another on the Fifth in 1995.138 In the second case, Justice White
concurred without opinion.139 The table below shows these data.
Justice

Concurrences

Powell
White
Burton
Totals

3
2
1
6

Cert.
Petitions
1
0
0
1

Cert.
Denied
1
N/A
N/A
1

Cert.
Granted
0
N/A
N/A
0

Affirmed

Reversed

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Table 6: Total Concurrences
Senior justices, it seems, are far less likely than active justices today
to concur. Indeed active Supreme Court justices concurred on average
four times in the October 2001 and 2012 terms, as opposed to the near
negligible numbers found here.140 In addition, the composite active judge
concurred four times in the period studied and the composite senior judge
concurred on average more than once in the same period.141 The numbers
show that both senior justices and judges are far less likely to concur than
their active counterparts. Perhaps the varying caseloads of the circuits and
Supreme Court explain this discrepancy, at least in part. The Supreme
Court may have a much more contentious caseload. Additionally,
Supreme Court concurrences can later take the place of majority
opinions—as seen in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown

135 Mickles v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1994) (Powell, J., concurring); Hodge
v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) (Powell, J., concurring) cert. denied 513 U.S.
1018 (1994); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 (4th Cir. 1988) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
136 Hodge, 31 F.3d at 168 (Powell, J., concurring) cert denied 513 U.S. 1018 (1994).
137 TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d 916, 929 (10th Cir. 1994) (White, J., concurring).
138 United States v. Maldonado, 42 F.3d 906, 914 (5th Cir. 1995) (White, J.,
concurring).
139 Id.
140 See Stat Pack for October Term 2012, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27,2013),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SCOTUSblog_StatPack_O
T121.pdf at 8; SCOTUSblog, Final Stat Pack October 2011 Term available at:
http://dailywrit.com/blog/uploads/2012/06/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT11_final.pdf at 7.
141 See, e.g.,Tucker v. Las Vegas Met. Police Dept., 470 Fed. Appx. 627, 629 (9th Cir.
2012) (Tallman, J., concurring); Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 474 (6th Cir. 2012) (Merritt,
J., concurring).
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Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer142—potentially explaining why active justices
are likely to concur, although the same rationales do not hold for active
circuit judges.
d. In the Minority and/or Dissenting
Seven of the ten senior justices who served on appellate courts after
leaving the Supreme Court dissented on lower court panels. Only Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Souter did not. Given the small number of cases
Justices Brennan and Marshall heard, this is not unexpected. Justice
Souter, however, has yet to author a dissent despite the significant number
of cases he has heard, thus breaking the pattern. Still, as the numbers
show, dissenting is rare.
Justice

Dissents

Reed
Burton
Clark
Stewart
Powell
O’Connor
White
Brennan
Marshall
Souter
Totals

10
3
2
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
20

Cert.
Petitions
3
1
1
2
1
0
0
N/A
N/A
N/A
8

Cert.
Denied
2
1
1
2
1
0
0
N/A
N/A
N/A
7

Cert.
Granted
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
N/A
N/A
N/A
1

Table 7: Total Dissents per Senior Justice

142

343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

Affirmed

Reversed

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N/A
N/A
N/A
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
N/A
N/A
N/A
1
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Cases Heard Per One Dissent
Souter

N/A

O'Connor

83

White

51

Marshall

N/A

Brennan

N/A

Powell

116

Stewart

22

Clark

198.5

Burton
Reed

21
19.1

Chart 7: Cases Heard per One Dissent by Senior Justice

Dissent Percentage
Souter

0.00%

O'Connor

1.20%

White

1.96%

Marshall

0.00%

Brennan

0.00%

Powell

0.86%

Stewart
Clark
Burton
Reed

4.55%
0.50%
4.76%
5.24%

Chart 8: Percentage of Dissents per Cases Heard as a Senior
Justice
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As Table 7 and Charts 7 and 8 indicate, Justice Reed was the most
likely senior justice to dissent. For every nineteen cases he heard, he
dissented in one.143 In one case, he dissented when a later Court of Claims
panel overruled an earlier opinion he joined.144 He was also the only senior
justice to dissent and see his rationales later win in the Supreme Court on
appeal.145 Justice Clark was the least likely to dissent, publishing two
dissents over the 397 published opinions he joined or authored, equating
to a 0.5 percent dissent rate.146 Interestingly, Justice Stewart authored two
dissents in the same case. First, he dissented from a panel decision of the
Seventh Circuit that vacated the trial court and then from the subsequent
en banc decision.147 Ultimately the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit,
three years after Justice Stewart’s original dissent, which the Court cited
for its correct conclusion that state court judgments do not bar subsequent
federal antitrust claims.148
The average senior justice dissented every 72 cases or 1.9 percent of
the time, while the median length between dissents was 51 published
decisions or in 1.03 percent of cases. In the October 2011 term, Supreme
Court Justices dissented, on average, every 5.67 cases, or 7.5 percent of
the time,149 while in the October 2012 term, they dissented every 5.9 cases,
or 7.5 percent of the time.150 Active justices, therefore, were much more
likely to dissent over the last two terms than the average senior justice over
his or her senior career. This result is likely the product of the high stakes
of Supreme Court jurisprudence as opposed to the appeals of right heard
on the circuit courts.
In addition, the composite active circuit judge dissented 5.5 times,
while the composite senior judge did so 1.5 times in the period studied,

143 See, e.g., Carson v. United States, 317 F.2d 370, 379 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (Reed, J.,
dissenting); Brewster v. U.S., 255 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Reed, J., dissenting).
144 Hynning v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 486, 494 (1958) overruled in part by Zeiger
v. United States, 295 F.2d 915, 917 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (Reed, J., dissenting).
145 Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 258 F.2d 660, 670 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) vacated sub nom. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co.,
358 U.S. 280, 79 S. Ct. 316, 3 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1959).
146 United States v. Williams, 561 F.2d 859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Clark, J., dissenting);
Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 1973)
(Clark, J., dissenting) cert denied 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
147 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083, 1096 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) vacated, 706 F.2d 1488, 1499 (7th Cir. 1983) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) on reh’g, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) rev’d, 470 U.S. 373, 105 S. Ct. 1327,
84 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1985).
148 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 383 (1985).
149 See SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 129, at 7.
150 See SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 111, at 7.
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amounting to just over 1 percent of the time, or once every 99 cases.151
Thus senior judges are even less likely to dissent than senior justices.
Given that many of the senior justices sat on different circuits, perhaps
they were more comfortable dissenting from their colleagues, as opposed
to the senior judges, who, for the most part, heard cases only in their own
circuits. Or, perhaps senior justices are trying to get the Supreme Court’s
attention to grant certiorari or protect areas of the law they have a
particularly high stake in from their active tenures. Definite answers
require more research beyond this essay’s scope.
IV. EXPLANATIONS
A. Results and Reality
The analyses presented in Part III, disprove the hypotheses presented
in Part II. No overarching theory explains the results. While the dataset
and its analyses paint a vivid picture of the careers of the senior justices,
only modest and partial explanations attend particular findings and results.
Building upon the data presented, this section first compares the careers of
senior justices. Then it offers some observations and interpretations of the
tenures of senior justices vis-à-vis active justices, active circuit judges, and
senior circuit judges.
Indeed, the data demonstrate that senior justices perform similarly to
active and senior circuit court judges. The only significant exception
being that senior justices are more likely to author a panel opinion than
senior circuit judges. But senior justices are not afforded extra deference,
as measured by percentage as opinion author and dissent rates, among
other data points. Nor do senior justices have any “extra insight” into the
Supreme Court, with a comparable reversal rate to circuit judges. With
the exception of Justice Clark’s famous circuit split anecdote and the
Supreme Court’s affirmance of his legal interpretation, senior justices do
not seem to have any special insight. Indeed, just as Justice Clark’s
anecdote illustrates special pull, Justice Stewart’s double dissent suggests
the opposite.
These findings do not diminish the importance of the gathered data.
Future scholars and researchers may find patterns or have insights
enabling them to mine more information from these raw results.
Nevertheless, the comparisons offered below show shed light on the

151 See, e.g., Overstreet v. Wilson, 686 F.3d 404, 410 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J.,
dissenting); Milligan v. Brd. Of Trustees of Southern Ill. U., 686 F.3d 378, 390 (7th Cir.
2012) (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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important careers of senior Supreme Court justices and mark the first
attempt to do so.
B. Senior Justices Compared
Senior justices have varied careers. Since senior status became
available to Supreme Court justices, some, like Justices Powell and Souter,
returned to their hometowns, while others, like Justices Clark and
O’Connor have crisscrossed the nation to sit on appellate court panels.
Some justices had short senior careers, like Justices Brennan and Marshall,
while others served for many years, like Justices Reed and Clark.
Justice Clark heard the most cases as a senior justice. Justice Souter,
who has only been a senior justice since 2009, has already heard 239 cases,
and may one day overtake Justice Clark’s records, given his forty-eight
case a year pace.152 The data show that Justices Souter, Stewart, and
Powell, in descending order, heard the most cases a year, doubling the
average among senior justices. These three also wrote the most opinions
per year of senior service. Justice White was the most likely to author an
opinion while sitting on a lower court, writing in 35 percent of the cases
he heard and besting the approximate average of 24 percent. While only
three justices concurred in panel decisions during their senior tenure, all
but three senior justices dissented, with Justice Reed being the most likely
to so.
Variety and uniqueness describe these senior justices’ service, as
measured by performance, location, and longevity. Overall, senior
justices have careers as varied as the individuals themselves with each
molding his or her senior career to fit his or her circumstances.
C. Senior Justices and Others
When compared senior justices against active justices, active circuit
judges, and senior circuit judges, a complex image emerges. Although
further scholarly inquiry will be necessary to determine the underlying
causes of these many differences, this essay will offer initial thoughts and
conclusions to account for the presented results.

152 Perhaps the reduced workload, or being in his native New Hampshire, has removed
the sting of his Supreme Court experience, whose terms he described as “sort of an annual
intellectual lobotomy.” Linda Greenhouse, David H. Souter: Justice Unbound, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/03/weekinreview/03gree
nhouse.html?adxnnl=1&ref=davidhsouter&adxnnlx=1368030753-1hs+G5ZKxU4sN5y
nnaeiqA (last visited May 8, 2013).
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i. Senior Justices and Active Justices
Senior justices heard about a quarter of the cases per year active
justices hear today. This is in line with the statutory requirements. Senior
justices authored opinions nearly a quarter of the time they heard a case,
more than doubling the active percentage. However, senior justices
authored only 3.46 cases a year, less than half the average for an active
Supreme Court justice. Senior justices also were far less likely to concur
than today’s Supreme Court justices, and they dissented much less often
than the nine current Supreme Court justices. Senior justices almost never
concurred, while the average active justice concurred just over four times
in the Court’s last two terms alone. On average, senior justices dissented
1.9% of the time, while active Supreme Court justices dissented in 7.5%
of the cases they heard in the October 2012 term. This difference is most
likely a product of the distinctive docket of the Supreme Court, which is
mostly discretionary, and the higher societal and jurisprudential stakes of
the Supreme Court. 153 Senior justices also may simply have less skin in
the game.
Given that senior justices hear a quarter of the cases the active
justices do, at first glance their much higher percentage as opinion author
seems noteworthy and may be significant. However, senior justices sit on
panels of three, while their active counterparts must divide their cases
among nine colleagues. This difference likely accounts for the
proportional variation of opinion writing. The fact that senior justices are
far less likely to dissent or concur is an interesting finding. It may partly
be explained by the fact that the cases they hear are less controversial than
those that reach the Supreme Court with fewer legal consequences on the
line. Therefore dissents and concurrences are less important. Further
research is necessary, however, to validate this hypothesis.
ii. Senior Justices and Active Circuit Judges
As compared to senior justices, active circuit judges wrote ten times
as many majority opinions in a year. Active circuit judges also concurred
more often, writing four concurrences in 2012, compared to the negligible
number of concurrences senior justices authored. Senior justices dissented
once every seventy-three cases or 1.9% of the time, compared to the 5.5
dissents active circuit judges wrote during the study period. Given that the
average senior justice heard twenty-two cases and dissented once every
seventy-three cases, each would dissent fewer than once every three years.
153 Posner, supra note 90, at 8 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . is largely a political court
when it is deciding constitutional cases.”); Posner, supra note 90 at 205-06 (describing the
discretionary docket of the Supreme Court versus the Circuit Courts).
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Thus, across all measures, senior justices author far fewer opinions,
concurrences, or dissents than active circuit judges. This result is to be
expected, given that active judges hear far more cases than senior justices.
Active judges are also more likely to write a panel opinion than a
senior justice. Senior justices write opinions 24 percent of the time, while
active circuit judges presumably write 33 percent on a panel of three. This
last conclusion, however, rests on the assumption that active circuit judges
write one-third of panel opinions. As the data show, senior judges
certainly do not write in one-third of the cases they hear, so the assumption
should be viewed with some skepticism. Further research into the precise
proportion of opinions any active circuit judge authors per case heard is
needed to determine this finding’s importance.
The fact that senior justices author fewer dissents than active circuit
judges seems to partially prove the first hypothesis, that their position
commands respect and so they are followed more often on any given panel.
However, they also author fewer opinions than active circuit judges,
precisely the opposite result than expected. Thus the predicted results
proved only partially true, suggesting other factors account for the data.
Interestingly, senior justices do mirror active circuit judges when it
comes to interpreting the law correctly, as measured by the number of
times the Supreme Court overturned a panel. Overall, senior justices were,
on average, slightly less likely to be reversed by the Supreme Court than
current appellate judges, either as authors or members of a panel majority.
Current Courts of Appeals are reversed 72 percent of the time when
certiorari is granted, while senior justices were reversed 60 percent of the
time as opinion authors and 66 percent of the time as members of a panel’s
majority. Thus, as compared across this dataset, against active circuit
judges, senior justices equal or slightly outperform active circuit judges.
These data demonstrates that former justices have little if any special
insight into the workings of the Supreme Court, nor are they more likely
to predict how the Court may rule on a case than active appellate judges.
Changing Court dynamics—one justice’s assumption of senior status does
introduce a new active justice to the bench—may account for this result.
Thus, despite the differences in caseload and written material, senior
justices come out on par with their active circuit judge colleagues. This
finding invalidates the second hypothesis that senior justices would have
some special insight into the Court’s operations, reasoning, or interests and
thus have a lower reversal rate than judges lacking their high court
experience.
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iii.Senior Justices and Senior Circuit Judges
Senior circuit judges offer good comparisons for senior justices.
Senior circuit judges heard, on average, 145 cases. They authored the
opinion of their panels fifteen times in 2012 or in 10 percent of the cases
they heard. Senior judges also concurred only once a year, coming far
closer to the senior justice tally. Senior judges dissented 1.5 times in the
period studied or in just over 1% (1/99) of the cases they heard. This result
is comparable to senior justices who dissented 1.9% (1/73) of time, or once
every three years. This represents a proportional difference but perhaps a
statistically insignificant one. Senior justices only best senior judges in
their average of being any panel’s majority writer, writing a quarter of the
time to senior judges’ average of one in every ten cases.
Intuitively, these parallels make sense. Senior judges have reduced
workloads, like senior justices. And because senior judges also must
perform a quarter of their old judicial work, and have a much higher
baseline of cases compared to senior justices, this likely explains the
differences in opinions written and percentages as author. Overall,
therefore, senior justices resemble their senior circuit judge counterparts
across a range of variables, disproving the second hypothesis.
CONCLUSION
At the outset of this project, it seemed that senior justices would have
an outsized impact on the federal judiciary, as measured through their
service on the circuit courts. Given their former positions, one expects
their insight to be special, their savvy to produce unique results regarding
reversals or certiorari, or their opinion and dissent writing to be active.
These expectations were unmet. Instead, the research has generated many
more questions to be answered.
Nevertheless, this study has made the following findings and
interpretations and calls for further study and analysis on each point.
First, senior justices seem to make an outsized impact only with
regards to opinion writing. They author opinions at a far higher proportion
than active justices or senior circuit judges. Their increased proportions
vis-à-vis active justices is likely because senior justices participate on
three-judge panels, not a full bench of nine justices, where opinions are
divided roughly equally. Their results compared with senior circuit judges
may be a product of their reduced workloads or presence on the panel, as
they hear fewer cases and can presumably write more often when they are
on a panel, and their prior position as an active justice may generate
deference from the other panel members. However, this finding does not
hold true vis-à-vis active circuit judges. Thus, deference alone does not
explain this finding.
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Second, senior justices hear far fewer cases than active justices,
active circuit judges, and senior circuit judges. The varying caseloads of
each group likely explain this result. Senior justices need only fulfill a 25
percent judicial workload requirement to remain eligible for Article III pay
increases. And reaching that number—with today’s small Supreme Court
docket—is not difficult. Further inquiry is needed to determine the extent
to which senior justices contemplate their statutory requirements when
deciding whether to sit by designation on a given circuit panel.
Third, senior justices are overruled at the same rate as circuit judges.
This result surprised the author the most. Senior justices should be adept
at avoiding reversal. Further research may wish to inquire whether senior
justices lose their ability to predict the Court’s outcomes overtime, or to
what extent shifts in Court personnel impact the chances of being reversed.
Nevertheless, senior justices are not endowed with special abilities after
leaving the high court.
Fourth, senior justices rarely concur, but neither do senior circuit
judges. This result presents a conundrum. Perhaps senior justices and
judges disdain concurring for personal reasons. Perhaps concurring on a
lower level offers less impact than doing so on the Supreme Court. Indeed,
concurrences on the Supreme Court often have long-lasting consequences,
such as Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown.154 Additional
research into the different results vis-à-vis active circuit judges is
necessary to explain the discovered disparity in concurrences and
determine the likelihood of concurring for any single active judge to offer
a more complete comparison.
Fifth, senior justices dissent less than active justices but more than
senior circuit judges. As with concurrences, it seems likely that the
Supreme Court’s higher stakes and discretionary docket make dissenting
more attractive to any single justice than the standard appeals by right
senior justices hear.155 Of note, however, senior justices are more willing
to dissent than senior judges, as a proportion of the cases they hear. One
explanation is that senior justices travel the country hearing cases more
often than senior circuit judges and thus are more willing to dissent
because they may not face repercussions over time for their dissents.156
154 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
155 Edwards, supra note 77, at 1644 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s docket consists of many
more ‘very hard’ cases than do those of lower appellate courts. The majority of the cases
in the circuit courts admit of a right or a best answer and do not require the exercise of
discretion.”); Posner, supra note 90, at 205-06.
156 Contra Edwards, supra note 77, at 1647 (“Unfamiliar group members . . . are likely
to be concern with social acceptance within the group. This leads to a tendency to conform:
unfamiliar group members are apprehensive about how they will be evaluated, which leads
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Alternatively, they may seek to signal to the Supreme Court that a
significant issue exists, as Justice Clark did in a similar vein when he
generated a circuit split. Additional study on this point could yield
significant details into the careers of senior justices and their decisionmaking processes, and shed more light on my first hypothesis, which was
seemingly disproved.
Senior justices’ service differs from that of active justices, active
circuit judges, and senior circuit judges in several respects. The data
present numerous questions, and the comparisons offered here represent a
starting point in understanding senior justices’ careers. The varying
conclusions presented throughout this essay and summarized here require
further study to determine if invisible rationales or confounding variables
are affecting the interpretations offered. The hypotheses offered seem
poorly supported and thus disproved. It is for future authors and scholars
to debate the interpretations presented herein and find other correlations.
Hopefully this essay spurs further interest and examination into the careers
of senior justices of the United States Supreme Court as they don their robs
and continue to hear and dispose of cases across the thirteen Courts of
Appeals of the United States.

them to suppress alternative perspectives and judgments and to behave like other group
members, regardless of the nature of their private beliefs.”) (internal citation omitted).

